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Sociological Expectations of Privacy 
 
Madiha Zahrah Choksi 
 
In the 21st century, ubiquitous technologies strengthen ubiquitous surveillance. Although the 
right to privacy is protected by the Constitution, challenges persist with respect to how it is 
interpreted in an age of data-rich technologies. This paper examines how the deficiencies of the 
Fourth Amendment in an age of techno-surveillance contribute to the widening scope and 
success of modern surveillance. The discussion outlines how modern communications 
technologies have coalesced with surveillance programs of the New York City Police 
Department, the National Security Agency, and commercial applications such as Facebook, and 
identifies how intractable institutional programs contribute to a lasting cultural effect in our 
society. The result is a snowballing effect of normalization: an identifiable cultural change in 
sociological expectations of privacy. On the one hand, state authorities such as the NSA can 
monitor and intercept all activity and interactions, with or without a warrant. Along the same 
lines, data collection on Facebook thrives through its commercialized “opt-out” or pseudo-
participatory model, in which consent is assumed or obtained covertly. While technological 
advances and legal reality are the common denominators of all three institutional models 
considered in this paper, Facebook’s surveillance structure presents the best opportunity for 
sociocultural expectations to oscillate. The threats posed by Facebook on freedom and autonomy 
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 إذا كنت ستسألني:
 ما الفرق بيني وبين السماء؟""
 حبيبي الفرق يا
 هل هذا عندما تضحك
 انسى السماء 
 




“Under observation, we act less free, which means we effectively are less free.”  
                      ― Edward Snowden 
  
 
As drafted by the Founding Fathers, the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect individuals 
from the potentially tyrannical powers of a police force. However, technological advances, the 
motivations of state actors, and deeply embedded corporate ties have facilitated the expansion of 
surveillance programs, challenging the Constitution’s ability to protect the privacy of American 
citizens. Under the Fourth Amendment guidelines, people have the right against all unreasonable 
searches and seizures, but the objective standard of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
clause also means that it has no bearing on what people actually expect. What, then, are the 
expectations of privacy in the 21st century? As ubiquitous institutional surveillance in the form of 
warrantless data and metadata collection becomes increasingly prevalent, how have expectations 
about privacy within American culture changed to threaten and challenge the fundamental right 
to privacy?  
 
In 2002, the newly appointed NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly set reforming how 
the department would manage their information technology capabilities as one of his principal 
objectives. Together, Kelly and his newly appointed deputy commissioner, well acquainted with 
the commercial information technology industry, revolutionized how the NYPD engaged in 
policing. In an effort to accelerate the police department’s intelligence gathering, the Information 
Technology Bureau sought strategic corporate partnerships to create repositories for data storage 
and querying.1 In its present form, the Domain Awareness System (DAS) is a tool that delivers 
analytics both to officers on the ground via a smartphone and to officers stationed in a precinct. 
Though its complex network of databases, sensors, devices, and software were first designed for 
the NYPD’s counterterrorism unit, the DAS is now used universally by the department and 
presents challenging questions about how data is collected, how it is used for predictive 
analytics, and more general issues surrounding the retention of personal data.2 
 
Similarly, in another model of government surveillance, the documents exposed by 
Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which the National Security Agency engaged in 
widespread data collection in the name of homeland security. Following the tragedy of 9/11, the 
NSA passed legislation to authorize large-scale metadata collection programs under the USA 
PATRIOT Act, many of which Edward Snowden uncovered in the summer of 2013. The 2001 
PATRIOT Act widened the scope of data that the government was able to collect from Internet 
service providers with subpoenas—information including names, addresses, session times, IP 
addresses, and bank accounts. The act also extended roving wiretapping practices that were once 
limited to phones to encompass email and web browsing. Moreover, the regulation was updated 
                                                 
1 E. S. Levine et al., “The New York City Police Department’s Domain Awareness System,” Interfaces 47, no. 1 
(February 2017): 70–84. 
2 Ibid., 74.  
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to reflect that communication surveillance for the purpose of gathering intelligence by the 
government must be for a “significant purpose” instead of being its “primary purpose.”3 
  
In a third, parallel realm, collecting information on user behavior constitutes the 
operational business model of powerhouse search engines and social media companies. On the 
web, social networking platforms, online shopping websites, and even digital news and media 
platforms attract millions of users who upload and share personal information that provides 
useful data about their consumption preferences back to the hosts. On Facebook, algorithmic 
processes help facilitate this process, and Facebook has become a surveillance engine, tracking, 
storing, targeting, and influencing all areas of user experience on and off the platform.  
  
Together, local, federal, and corporate exploitation of information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) in surveillance programs points to a social reality in which technologies 
have been transformed to work against the individuals for whom they were created to serve. This 
paper posits that the practical applications of emerging technologies have a created a lasting 
cultural effect on the scope of our expectation of privacy. As society becomes increasingly 
familiar with the feeling of ubiquitous techno-surveillance, it is easy to forget that this was not 
inevitable. This reality is an outcome of deliberate actions by actors like the NSA, the NYPD, 
and Facebook, and there were other possible realities along the way. By examining the 
contemporary techniques of information collection utilized by local, federal, and commercial 
institutions, this paper problematizes our quotidian interactions with surveillance technology, 
assessing why the experience of being surveilled is not normal, even though it is normalized. 
Ultimately, as a result of the social process of normalization, the threat of the erosion of privacy 





Privacy is a fundamental human right, as it corresponds to the dignity of all individuals, 
and forms a critical part in the fulfillment of other equal and inalienable rights such as Freedom 
of Thought, Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Association outlined in the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. The right to privacy can be found in the Fourth Amendment of 
the Constitution, and in international human rights law under Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 of the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights, and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Privacy in the 21st century 
is a pressing issue, and both domestic and international courts recognize the threats to individual 
and state privacy posed by data-rich ICTs. As such, this paper investigates the intersection of 
rights, technologies, and social experience to underline the critical relationship between all three 
and their role in creating a fragile state of privacy.  
 
In 1440, the invention of mechanical moveable type in Europe initiated the era of mass 
communication, revolutionizing human society. Among its accomplishments, the printing press 
allowed for the dissemination of books, which empowered individuals to read and process 
information in solitude and without an intermediary. Such power, though overlooked in today’s 
                                                 
3 Christian Fuchs, Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media (New York: Routledge, 
2012), 11. 
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time of instantaneously available information, was made possible by people’s ability to access 
and process information in private settings and is the foundation of universal freedoms, 
specifically freedom of thought and of privacy.  
  
The sociocultural effects of modern pervasive surveillance are not commonly linked to 
the printing press and the early era of mass communication. However, the objective of this thesis 
is to examine how advancing ICTs and the institutions that depend on them have created a 
cultural effect on how much and even what type of surveillance society expects. Within the 
NYPD, the NSA, and the commercial model of surveillance (as represented by Facebook), 
implementing the tools used to gather data is falsely presented as a necessary undertaking 
operating within a limited scope. In reality, the asymmetric balance of power between surveillant 
and the surveilled is such that collecting and processing one’s data becomes an end in and of 
itself—one in which much more than what is sought out is collected. 
  
In contrast with early ICTs, present-day information technologies, through which we not 
only communicate, but schedule, navigate, and even think, are infused with enormous amounts 
of personal data and have become central to institutional information collection. Without the 
capacity to privately, or freely, access information, people effectively cede control of their 
freedom of thought, and by extension, their individuality and their ability to make decisions—
fundamental concepts of humanity. In other words, the printing press represented a mode of mass 
information dissemination characterized by personal empowerment, free and spontaneous 
inquiry, and freedom from intermediaries between information and an individual. However, 
contemporary modes of accessing information are rife with surveillance technologies as benign 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review: Culture, Nature, and Surveillance 
 
In order to make a meaningful argument about how a cultural shift in 21st-century society 
has materialized, we must first review the multi-faceted definitions of culture, nature, and 
surveillance. By doing so, the literature review outlines existing works to establish both the 
discipline in which this paper falls as well as the ideas and trends to which it seeks to contribute. 
 
 
2.1. Culture and Nature 
  
In Keywords, Raymond Williams claims that culture is one of the most complicated 
words in the English language, tracing its historical development through European languages. In 
its earliest use, culture was a noun of process which applied to crops or animals and later 
extended to a process of human development.4 A major turning point in the development of the 
term came in 1660, when John Milton connected government and culture, defining culture as a 
general social process that is a definitive state of development.5 A final transformation of the 
term designated culture as a concept, which according to Williams, can be categorized into three 
groups. The first group returns us to the idea of culture as a process, an abstract noun that traces 
a general process of development. The second, inspired by Herder and Klemm, delineates a 
lifestyle of either a group of people, a place, or a period in time. The third and final group 
catalogs the term as one that reports customs and procedures of intellectual and artistic 
endeavors. Williams points out that the third category has become the most universal, where 
culture includes literature, painting, and theatre, as well as history, philosophy, and scholarship.6 
  
In establishing what it means to exist in and participate in a culture, we accept that 
culture shares a relationship with nature and that which is accepted to be natural. Nature can be 
also be identified in three separate categories of meaning. Williams outlines that the first 
category of nature is the quality or character of something. The second is an innate force that 
directs the earth, as well as humans, sometimes simultaneously, and the third consists of the 
material or tangible word both with and without humans.7 Nature and reason became connected 
phenomena through the formation of laws, a system of rules enforced through social or 
governmental institutions to regulate behavior. Accordingly, nature identifies something that 
existed prior to human development, a distinction from something created by mankind.8 
However, Williams adds that if something connected to humans has been artificially created and 
disseminated over an undefined but extended period of time, it may be classified as a natural 
entity or experience.9 The insidious expansion of surveillance represents the process of 
anthropogenic phenomena eventually being regarded as natural simply by their transmission by 
                                                 
4 Raymond Williams, Keywords : A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
49. 
5 Ibid., 50. 
6 Ibid., 54.  
7 Ibid., 167.  
8 Williams, Keywords, 168. 
9 Ibid. 
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figures of authority: The more time that passes where surveillance is seen as essential for 





Surveillance is a phenomenon that has accompanied human society since its inception as 
the “regard or attendance to others (whether a person, a group, or an aggregate as with a national 
census) or to factors presumed to be associated with these.”10 A central element to surveillance is 
the collection of data that can be traced back to a single individual or an individual within a 
larger group or category.11 We can observe early models of state surveillance for the purpose of 
maintaining control over the state and its subjects in 16th-century England. People in positions of 
power used state surveillance to maintain their power, or as Lyon states, as an inherent practice 
of governance as opposed to crude social control.12 This earliest appearance of centralized 
surveillance saw the recording of births, deaths, marriages, and churches, and enshrined a 
framework for modern central state surveillance practices. 
  
Whereas the earliest forms of surveillance established a practice of recording information 
in an effort to maintain bureaucratic control over groups and populations,13 surveillance practices 
eventually saturated all areas of human society. According to Karl Marx, surveillance in the 
workplace relates to maintaining control over laborers in the context of a capitalist economy. 
Alternatively, Max Weber, or the Weberian theory, asserts that the collection and storage of 
information in the workplace is linked to efficient practices within the organization. Most critical 
to this paper, however, is Michel Foucault’s groundbreaking work on surveillance and discipline. 
Foucault maintains that societies have created means of ordering society at the institutional level 
that seamlessly integrate fear of discipline as a way to ensure control and regulated, or 
normalized, patterns of behavior.14 
 
 
2.2.1. Panoptic vs. Non-Panoptic Surveillance 
 
Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon symbolizes what Foucault describes as the “modern 
disciplinary society.”15 The precision in the space’s architectural design enables the enforcer to 
surveil the prison in its entirety without being seen.16 The incitement of fear thus provokes self-
surveilling and self-disciplinary habits by the subordinate persons surveilled so as to avoid 
punishment from the all-seeing enforcer. The panoptic view holds that the Internet’s webbed 
                                                 
10 Gary T. Marx, “Surveillance Studies,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 
(Elsevier, 2015), 734. 
11 Ibid. 
12 David Lyon, Surveillance after September 11 (Malden, MA: Distributed in the USA by Blackwell Pub, 2003), 23. 
13 David Lyon, Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society (Minneapolis, United States: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1994), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/columbia/detail.action?docID=310274, 4. 
14 Ibid., 7. 
15 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
16 Fuchs, Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media, 126. 
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infrastructure allows it to function as a tool through which economic surveillance can occur.17 
Cookies and indexing features are fundamental to search engines that, by design, “collect and 
categorize human behavior.”18 Such “identification tools” constitute surveillance mechanisms 
used to categorize people and also correlate to the interests of political actors who help facilitate 
their widespread development and implementation.19 Within this model, users are unable to 
modify or examine the software mediating their experience, fundamentally depriving them of 
their autonomy and control. Moreover, in such domains, “controls are exercised on the basis of a 
space defined on the network,”20 meaning that the operated space is controlled by an external 
source, such as an Internet service provider.  
 
The non-panoptic outlook argues that centralized Internet surveillance is neutral and 
creates positive and negative consequences for citizens.21 The most cited positive consequences 
include the safety and protection of citizens, while negative consequences relate to the state’s 
despotic control.22 However, scholars who hold neutral perspectives admit that the relationship 
between capitalism and the public sphere buttresses the asymmetrical balance of power23 at the 
expense of end users. Through the increasing use of mobile and other tracking devices, the 
driving forces behind expanding surveillance within society are no longer limited to traditional 
economic and political forces but involve technological forces as well.24 Some scholars opine 
that certain types of surveillance can be justified given their intent and attributes,25 while others 
cite only advantages, such as the “empowering” ability of surveillance that connects people and 
bolsters social interaction.26 A final perspective that emphasizes the role of users in surveillance 
practices speaks to the non-panoptic nature of modern surveillance because, by choosing to use 




2.3. Surveillance Society, Technology, and Culture 
  
As surveillance becomes increasingly computerized, Rule et al. state that the objective of 
modern surveillance is to exert influence through systematic awareness of people’s lives and that 
this model has become a standard for all modern societies. Such forms of systematic, 
information-based surveillance practices expand into institutional routines, through which the 
routine and methodological surveillance of everyday life simultaneously become central to 
modern social relations. Along these lines, Anthony Giddens asserts that modern societies are 
                                                 
17 G. Elmer, “Spaces of Surveillance: Indexicality and Solicitation on the Internet,” Critical Studies in Mass 
Communication 14, no. 2 (June 1997): 182. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 168. 
20 Ibid., 170. 
21 Fuchs, Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media, 127. 
22 David Lyon, ed., Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination (London: New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 164. 
23 Fuchs, Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media, 128. 
24 Lyon, “Surveillance as Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination,” 99. 
25 Fuchs, Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media, 130. 
26 Ibid., 131. 
27 Ibid., 132. 
  7 
inherently information societies and, as such, were always at the brink of becoming surveillance 
societies.28 
 
David Burnham states that emerging computer technologies are increasingly autonomous 
and have surpassed the effective control of humans, a theory which inherently limits a 
meaningful discussion on surveillance culture. Conversely, Kevin Wilson argues that this 
technological mechanism is a tool of capitalism as a form of social and behavioral control. In 
sum, while technologies develop thanks to their iterative power to increase their capacity and 
influence, David Lyon theorizes that the augmentation of technology is a social process. This 
process is driven by more than just economic and political factors; it also includes institutional 
powers as willing participants in shaping its trajectory.29 
  
 Roger Clarke’s term “dataveillance” is critical in this discussion, as it defines a 
surveillance society as one in which the application of information technologies facilitates the 
monitoring of the communication and actions of people. This view is confirmed in Gary Marx’s 
report covering undercover policing in the United States. Marx argues that the social 
implications of computerized or systemized information-based surveillance, or what he calls 
“new surveillance,” are dangerous in that they are powerful and efficient while decreasingly 
visible.30 “New surveillance” encompasses new techniques such as computer matching, first used 
in 1970 by governmental departments to match data from a variety of different sources in an 
attempt to categorize and sort groups of people. Moreover, he asserts that “computers 
qualitatively alter the nature of surveillance—routinizing, broadening, and deepening it.”31 
 
Surveillance culture has been cited by William Staples in his work studying day-to-day 
interactions with surveillance. John McGrath’s Loving Big Brother applies the term in a 
discussion of performative surveillance, and Jonathan Finn connects surveillance culture to 
camera surveillance and the proliferation of cameras for surveillance programs in public spaces.32 
While surveillance culture is frequently discussed, according to David Lyon, the term has yet to 
be defined as a phenomenon treated and applied in a similar manner to the concepts of state 






                                                 
28 Thomas J Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew Feenberg, Modernity and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014), 
167. 
29 Lyon, Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society, 11.  
30 Ibid., 168. 
31 Ibid., 53.  
32 Lyon, Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society, 11.  
33 David Lyon, “Digital Citizenship and Surveillance| Surveillance Culture: Engagement, Exposure, and Ethics in 
Digital Modernity,” International Journal of Communication 11, no. 0 (February 14, 2017): 824. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework, Hypothesis, and Methodology 
 
3.1. Theoretical Framework  
 
The theoretical framework for this paper is guided by the social process of normalization, 
as defined by Foucault, and the legal framework of privacy in the United States, as defined by 




This paper applies Michel Foucault’s concept of normalization to understand the rise of 
modern surveillance practices facilitated by data emerging technologies. This perspective on how 
societies accept change emphasizes that social control over behavioral norms is enforced in two 
ways. First, this happens through what Foucault calls “discursive practices,” which seek to 
understand how language, social institutions, subjectivity, quotidian social interactions, and 
power are connected. For example, how can we examine the act of submitting one’s fingerprint 
within drastically different contexts, such as in a police precinct versus via an iPhone?34 Second, 
institutional sanctions compel people to comply to social norms, such as the recent TSA policy 
requiring facial scans to fly internationally. Modern surveillance effectively normalizes 
surveillance technologies, and it occupies all areas of sociological life: emotions, symbolism, and 
culture.35 Therefore, the normalization of surveillance extends beyond the proliferation of 
surveillance technologies and determines how technologies are immersed into the norms and 
institutions of our society and, by extension, are reflected in other areas of modern society.36 
With respect to the objective of this paper, the social process of normalization to surveillance 
culture is best understood by examining the critical relationship between surveillance 
technologies, institutions, and judicial limitations.  
 
 
3.1.2. The Fourth Amendment: “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" 
 
The shared obscurity of the surveillance models discussed in this paper pertains to the 
Fourth Amendment’s definition and application of search and seizure. As written by the 
Founding Fathers, the Fourth Amendment aims to ensure that American citizens are “secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”37 The 
Fourth Amendment also serves to preserve the “legitimacy of the state”38 against such forms of 
                                                 
34 David Murakami Wood and C. William R. Webster, “Living in Surveillance Societies: The Normalisation of 
Surveillance in Europe and the Threat of Britain’s Bad Example,” Journal of Contemporary European Research 5, 
no. 2 (August 1, 2009): 259–73. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid., 264. 
37 U.S. Constitution, amend. IV.  
38 David Gray and Danielle Keats Citron, “The Right to Quantitative Privacy,” Minnesota Law Review, Business 
Insights: Essentials, November 2013, 93. 
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unwarranted search, partially in response to the use of writs of assistance by British agents 
during the American Revolution. Accordingly, the rights protected under the Fourth Amendment 
constrain the power available to law enforcement agents in apprehending criminals.39 Moreover, 
the Fourth Amendment concerns criminal procedure which state parties must follow when 
conducting searches and seizures in criminal processes. These rules govern how warrants are 
issued and what happens in criminal prosecutions. Fourth Amendment case law overlooks 
government activities that conduct searches and seizures, what constitutes the reasonable 
grounds for searches and seizures, as well as how to deal with violations of the Fourth 
Amendment. In practice, the legal grounds on which the government can undertake searches and 
seizures must be warranted by a court that explicitly states the place, person, or thing to be 
searched.40  
 
Following Katz v. United States in 1967, the Fourth Amendment abandoned its 
antecedent requirement for a “trespass” or intrusion on property in order for a search to be of 
constitutional significance.41 The question of whether there is a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” both in the physical and social context of a search becomes more significant, and the 
Fourth Amendment now protects both individual privacy as well as physical locations and 
property. The landmark case redefined the aforementioned understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment, using an ambiguous interpretation “based on the idea of reasonable expectations of 
privacy.”42 In regard to information collection through digital or analog methods, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy is measured by the court’s interpretation through the use of the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test, which ostensibly determines if and how the Fourth 
Amendment applies based on subjective and objective factors such as the place, time, and 
surroundings in which the act in question occurred.43 Since courts define such “reasonable 
expectations” in different ways, vagueness in the definition’s interpretation persists, 
complicating its application in modern cases of pervasive surveillance efforts.  
 
Coupled with the inadequacies of the “Katz test” in regulating ever-changing and 
modernizing surveillance technologies, three doctrines that emerged following Katz exclude 
“most of the tracking, surveillance, and data aggregation technologies . . . beyond the scope of 
effective Fourth Amendment review.”44 The “public observation doctrine” maintains that, in such 
cases where information has become available in a public space, law enforcement agents are not 
restricted by the Fourth Amendment’s search criteria because the person has exposed 
information in a public manner, effectively surrendering any reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Per the Supreme Court’s ruling on the topic of police eavesdropping, should law enforcement 
                                                 
39 Gray and Citron, “The Right to Quantitative Privacy,” 93. 
40 Matthew De Voy Jones, “The Orwellian Consequence of Smartphone Tracking: Why a Warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment Is Requited Prior to Collection of GPS Data from Smartphones Note,” Cleveland State Law Review 62 
(2014): 216. 
41 The FBI incriminated Charles Katz by recording his public phone booth conversations through an electronic 
eavesdropping device. The courts ruled that the phone booth was a protected area where one could expect 
reasonable privacy, similar to the home. The FBI made a physical intrusion into a “private” space and the search was 
“unreasonable.” 
42 David Gray, “The Fourth Amendment in an Age of Surveillance” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017): 249. 
43 Orin S. Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution,” 
Michigan Law Review 102, no. 5 (2004): 805. 
44 David Gray, “The Fourth Amendment in an Age of Surveillance,” 78. 
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officers intercept information, leads, or observe actions in a public space, they have done so 
lawfully.  
 
Along the same lines, the “third-party doctrine” holds that the Fourth Amendment does 
not protect information the government may access through a third party. For example, the 
NSA’s Section 215 metadata collection program is constitutionally justified under the third-party 
doctrine, as people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in call records generated by 
telecommunications providers.45 As information is shared with a third party voluntarily, a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment has not taken place. Lastly, the Katz ruling changed 
antecedent rules pertaining to Fourth Amendment standing. In order to meet the constitutional 
requirement of presenting a “case” or “controversy,” federal courts must demonstrate that they 
have “standing.”46 Updated rules governing Fourth Amendment standing heavily constrain who 
can challenge government searches, how individuals or groups of people can challenge 
institutional search and seizure programs, the evidence required for a Fourth Amendment 
standing, as well as the types of remedies that can be pursued.47  
 
In an age of ubiquitous technology in which embedded surveillance techniques are 
complex and interconnected, the Supreme Court acknowledges the challenges in invoking the 
Fourth Amendment’s critical role in protecting privacy. In the 2012 landmark case US v. Jones 
pertaining to digital means of evidence gathering, the quantity of data collected was the 
overarching issue insofar as it grossly surpassed the data collection relevant to the case.48 The 
courts considered the “mosaic theory,”49 which focuses solely on aggregation and asks whether 
or not a large number of isolated non-searches (not requiring a warrant), when examined in the 
aggregate, can constitute a search if the data reveal a “mosaic.” As such, because the location of 
Jones’ vehicle was collected around the clock for four weeks, the terms of the warrant had been 
violated.50 While a handful of Justices detailed in their opinions on the case to their growing 
disquietude about modern surveillance and Fourth Amendment rights,51 they postponed outlining 
the types of adjustments they would prescribe and how they may be justified and applied under 
the law to a more appropriate case in the future.52  
 
Although Katz widened the scope of what constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, the public observation doctrine and the third-party doctrine impede the efficacy of 
the law’s ability to protect against pervasive surveillance. The objective legal standard 
maintained by the Fourth Amendment described here stands in sharp contrast to actual 
sociological expectations of privacy. In instances where surveillance tools gather data in public 
spaces and intercept information through “surreptitious eavesdropping,”53 the government is 
                                                 
45 David Gray, “The Fourth Amendment in an Age of Surveillance,” 89.  
46 David Gray, “Collective Standing under the Fourth Amendment,” American Criminal Law Review 55 (2018): 86. 
47 Ibid., 78.   
48 Ibid., 90. 
49 The “mosaic theory” in legal scholarship seeks to determine whether the aggregate personal information collected 
about an individual during an investigation violates their reasonable expectation of privacy. 
50 Ibid., 91. 
51 Gray, “The Fourth Amendment in an Age of Surveillance,” 100. 
52 Ibid., 101. 
53 Nuzhat Chowdhury, “I, Spy (but Only on You): Raza V. City of New York, the Civil Rights Disaster of Religious 
& Ethnic-Based Surveillance, and the National Security Excuse,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 46, no. 2 
(Winter 2015): 317. 
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arguably exploiting an individual’s assumed expectation of privacy.54 In the 21st century, the 
legal standard and sociological expectations are wholly unconnected as a result of the 
deficiencies of the Fourth Amendment. While the process of normalization described in this 
paper cannot inform the standard of Fourth Amendment law directly, the law nevertheless 
creates rules and norms that shed light on how people and institutions behave. Fourth 
Amendment deficiencies inform and empower surveillance institutions to wield influence over 




3.2. Hypothesis and Methodology 
 
Modern ICTs’ far-reaching capabilities facilitate 21st-century surveillance, as do their 
corresponding tendency towards exploitation not yet acknowledged by the Fourth Amendment. 
As technologies fundamental to surveillance practices using big data (e.g., the Internet of Things, 
smartphones, and cloud computing) win favor among individual and business customers, those 
who have an economic or political interest manipulate them in order to maintain power over the 
public. Examining the integration of modern communications technologies within institutional 
frameworks of policing, national security, and commercial corporations will help us understand 
this phenomenon. 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to the discourse on surveillance culture by interpreting 
how the Fourth Amendment’s limited application has resulted in the normalization of shifting 
and undefined sociological expectations of privacy. It posits that sociological expectations of 
privacy are determined at the oscillating intersection of culture, technology, and legal reality, and 
it aims to answer the following questions: Can shifts in sociological expectations of privacy be 
explained as the product of normalization? What opportunities exist for reversing this process? 
 
I hypothesize that the aforementioned institutions are creating and facilitating cultural 
norms related to information collection by implementing surveillance techniques that use big 
data that develop in sync with data-gathering consumer technologies that are becoming ever 
more common among the general public. As such, surveillance becomes as ubiquitous as 
technology, a shift that directly challenges expectations of privacy. I argue that normalization is 
the most identifiable cultural effect. The process of normalization is twofold: first, through 
changes in modern communications technologies, and second, through the application of these 
technologies in institutional surveillance programs unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Moreover, I hypothesize that sociological interpretations concerning expectations of privacy can 
oscillate as society becomes increasingly permeated by institutional surveillance mechanisms, 
complicating the process of normalization and presenting an opportunity for the process to pause 
or break.  
 
Chapter 4 begins by outlining the risks inherent in advancing ICTs. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 
examine how institutions dependent on the aggregation of information collection have 
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revolutionized their various listening apparatuses by leveraging emerging communications 
technologies, prompting sociological changes to the expectation of privacy. Specifically, Chapter 
5 focuses on the New York Police Department’s DAS, Chapter 6 contains an exploration of the 
National Security Agency’s (NSA) Verizon and XKeyscore metadata collection programs, and 
Chapter 7 critiques Facebook’s data-sharing business model. Chapter 8 concludes the paper by 
looking beyond Facebook’s most recent debacles, pointing to a unique opportunity for an 
oscillation in expectations. This paper’s qualitative analysis draws from documents that outline 
the internal workings of the organizations implementing ICT-based surveillance programs. These 
include primary documents published by the New York Police Department and the NSA and 
critical investigative reports published by The Intercept, the Associated Press, and the New York 
Times. Sources intended to capture the public effect of these programs include surveys 























“Computation, storage, and communications capacity are in the hands of practically every 
connected person—and these are the basic physical capital means necessary for producing 
information, knowledge, and culture in the hands of something like 600 million to a billion 
people around the planet.” 
          - Yochai Benkler 
 
 
4.1. Modern Technologies Overview 
 
This chapter identifies the modern information technologies that expose user information, 
as well as how and why they do that, and it explains what makes a technological design or 
mechanism dangerous from a privacy perspective. The most critical features that modern 
technologies have in common are their connections to computing systems and webbed networks, 
which, by design, constantly produce data about all inputs and outputs. In other words, a 
computer is a record-keeping machine that documents every action a user takes. Once connected 
to the Internet, the amount of data produced is almost unlimited, including the sites visited, how 
long the user stays on a site, what the user types in search boxes, what the user clicks on, and so 
forth.55 Modern technologies discussed in this thesis are dependent on the relationship between 
computers, the Internet, and data.  
 
Increasingly, 21st-century American society is co-existing with computers. For example, 
smartphones are computers; their apps constantly produce and transfer data, GPS sensors 
pinpoint a user’s exact location, and all networked devices produce and store an unimaginable 
amount of data and metadata.56 In-store purchases, unless paid for by cash, use computers to 
store data about the transaction: what was purchased, the cost, the time, and the bank card used. 
In New York City, it is unlikely that one can take a walk in Manhattan without being picked up 
by one of the city’s over 9,000 CCTV cameras operated by the NYPD.57 Video camera 
technology is everywhere—not just city streets—from grocery stores, to apartment lobbies, to 
smartphones that create and store photos and videos, therefore producing even more data. The 
list does not quite end there, as computers and tools connected to the Internet that produce and 
transfer data also exist in the transportation industry (self-driving cars), in the home (smart 
appliances such as Nest, Alexa, Google Home, etc.), and even health care (FitBit, Apple 
Health).58 The most dangerous aspect of the change from mass communications technologies 
such as the printing press, radio, and television to modern networked devices is that information 
is now received and disseminated with a traceable and identifiable record.59  
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4.2. Metadata Collection 
 
Metadata has become an indispensable component of modern data collection. In its most 
elementary definition, “metadata is data about data.”60 In the example of email communications, 
everything from a sender’s address to the receiver’s address, message size, and time sent are 
some types of metadata that can be collected. Metadata encompasses all of the data surrounding 
communications, except content61—information that is arguably equally, if not more, revealing 
than content itself. Some scholars assert that while metadata has been widely accepted to define 
the collection of telephony data under NSA’s Section 215 program, discussed later in this paper, 
the definition is somewhat exclusive of other types of metadata collection that can occur within 
networked communications, for example, text message metadata, which in some NSA programs 
also encompasses machine-derived content.62 
 
Metadata surveillance has become far more useful to those collecting data than the actual 
topics discussed in a communication, or the “about” content of collected data.63 Since the “about” 
content requires contextual analysis to be useful, metadata maps the patterns of behavior of an 
individual.64 Machine analysis of collected metadata can reveal insights into connections and 
patterns of behavior65 as the quantity of data becomes more valuable than the content of any 
single conversation. Such aggregation can paint a telling portrait of one’s patterns of association, 
however misleading or misinterpreted, and can still be used by law enforcement to build a case 
or by private corporations for the purposes of targeted advertising.66 
 
 
4.3. Data Storage Capacity 
 
As data is constantly produced through computing devices such as smartphones, cameras, 
and wireless network sensors, data sets also grow constantly. The amount of data created every 
day in 2015 exceeded 2 quintillion bytes, with the number growing every day.67 As the sheer 
volume of data produced by Internet-connected ICTs increased in the 21st century, the only way 
business models and government programs based on data and metadata collection could thrive 
was through parallel advances in storage capacity. Moore’s law posits that the processing power 
of a central processing unit (CPU) and disk drives doubles approximately every 18 months.68 
Furthermore, as data continues to accumulate from a wide variety of sources and databases, data 
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“preprocessing” tools designed for cleaning, reducing, integrating, and transforming data are 
continuously evolve to remedy messy and patchy datasets.  
 
 
4.4. Risky by Design: Investigating Design, Processes, and Features 
 
4.4.1. Closed Source or Proprietary Code  
 
The development of broadband infrastructure hardware runs parallel to digital 
infrastructure, or software development. Whereas computer hardware in the form of 
motherboards, data storage, graphics, and sound cards constitutes the physical make-up of a 
computer system, software programs tell or direct a machine to carry out a set of instructions.69 
Software programs regulate a computer’s functionality; in other words, hardware has little to no 
value without instructions that tell the computer what to do.70 Users’ levels of digital literacy, as 
well as their access to information in the form of a basic conceptualization of a piece of 
software’s behind-the-interface functionality, wield enormous influence over their experience 
and agency while interacting with emerging technologies.  
 
Critical debates and lawsuits between Microsoft, Apple, and AOL in the 1990s were 
principally concerned with the availability of software source code.71 Whereas closed-source 
software programs such as Microsoft Office, Adobe Suite, and McAfee Anti-Virus do not 
publish their source code, open-source programs do. Open-source programs allow average users 
to view, alter, and enhance the source code to meet their specific needs. Moreover, open-source 
programs are free and can be widely shared with anyone for any purpose. While open source 
software is a development methodology, Richard Stallman highlights the differences between 
open source and the idea of “free software.”72 Stallman argues that free software is a social 
movement, and that “free/open software advocates and media activists recognize software’s 
double life as integral to safeguarding certain notions about openness, laterality, and by 
implication, democratic uses and applications of ICTs.”73  
 
The lack of access, knowledge and literacy of source code, perpetuates a cycle by which 
closed-source programs collect user data. As users increasingly expect a web experience more 
tailored to their region, data collection, and customized experiences all around the Internet of 
Things, the corporate economy of the net flourishes. The prioritization of user interests and user 
capabilities as a way of respecting user privacy is critical to the open-source model, without 
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4.4.2. Cloud Storage 
 
As briefly introduced above, data sets are growing with new sources, and computing and 
communications technologies are converging with minimal distinction between the three 
industries of computing, communications, and storage systems.74 Personal computers and 
smartphones and have a built-in storage system, with built-in memory and options for free cloud 
storage. For example, Microsoft OneDrive offers 15 gigabytes of free storage, and Baidu Cloud 
offers two terabytes.75 There is no longer a need for modern-day ICT users to invest in pricey 
computing systems with a large amount of memory or storage capabilities because a relatively 
small device, once connected to a cloud, can help users gain access to anything they may need. 
While there are open-source hosting services, the trend set by industry leaders to build and 
market private clouds has been become the norm. These cloud systems, owned and operated by 
private corporations, are effectively out of the control of their end users, who not only lack 
control but also infrastructure awareness and process.  
 
Early 20th-century databases fingerprinted the incarcerated, conducted psychological 
screening tests for those enlisted in military services, and organized income tax collection for 
working citizens.76 Within these models, data was collected and stored through an analog system 
with no data or industry cross-over with respect to how and where the data was stored. In the 
21st-century model, cloud computing and data storage are centralized and outsourced to the 
cloud.77 On the one hand, as with any emerging technology, there are advantages to cloud storage 
models: End users—from students and researchers to government and non-governmental 
organizations dealing with large amounts of data sets—are unconcerned about how and where to 
store their data, virtually eliminating the need to spend money on external hardware. On the 
other hand, there are major security risks associated with cloud storage infrastructure as well as 
uncertainties about how outsourced data is being used or commercialized. In sum, as the cloud 
storage model only makes the external-facing infrastructure visible, it separates end users from 
its operational infrastructure, which is built upon remote machines,78 and ultimately ceases end 
users’ control over the fate of their data.  
 
 
4.4.3. ICT Convergence and Privacy  
 
ICT convergence occurs when emerging technologies intersect with previously defined 
industry boundaries.79 In this section, we address how ICT convergence drives the trend of 
diminishing privacy and brings formerly disparate technologies together in networked and 
connected ecosystem. 
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Convergence as a phenomenon has promoted change within various industries,80 namely, 
the merging of technological mechanisms, including ICTs, forming a trajectory in which the 
bundled services outperform their capabilities as individual entities. For example, a smartphone 
in 2018 contains technologies that would only have been found in many separate devices only 30 
years ago. This process is twofold: It encompasses the convergence of knowledge bases as well 
as that of technologies, and it is made possible by the modernization of ICTs.81 At one point in 
time, the phone line was the apparatus through which one would access the Internet, whereas in 
2018, the Internet is used to access the phone and its other connected features.82 The declining 
cost of ICT components is one of the critical forces driving convergence. In the 1980s, for 
example, joining CPUs and wireless communications technologies on the same chipset offered a 
combined product unit that functioned better and more efficiently than the two components 
individually. In other words, as the costs for parts drop, connecting technologies becomes more 
cost effective than keeping them independent.83 A natural reaction of corporations was to adapt 
to this model of convergence, where a company concerned with creating and marketing 
consumer products would effectively survey and gather information from industries that would 
initially appear unrelated, such as the health, software, and service industries.84 The convergence 
of technologies, as well as new synergies between industries, correlates to unique possibilities 
for an ICT. Emerging technologies are invented, evolve, and spread, whether as consequences of 
organizational goals, an effort to establish industry standards, or even a response to competitors, 
and convergence becomes a self-perpetuating process.  
 
Convergence has been most concentrated in the modern smartphone, as mentioned above. 
With so much attention focused on its development, the smartphone contains elements of a 
variety of other technologies, such as telephones, cameras, GPS, web browsers, language 
translators, CD players, flashlights, alarm clocks, gaming consoles, location trackers, 
stethoscopes, among others, thanks to the combination of user demand and the promise of 
connecting analog technologies to the Internet. For example, an analog alarm clock is a 
fundamentally different technology than the digital version that tracks the quality and duration of 
a user’s sleep and suggests a bedtime, storing this information in a remote cloud. These services 
have converged in this device because of the commercial potential offered by the data that 
people produce when using a formerly “airgapped” technology on an Internet-connected 
platform.  
 
Symbiotically, convergence lays the groundwork for the creation of hybrid applications, 
such as a camera app that seamlessly shares users photos with their friends. The camera industry 
needs to react to consumer preferences that did not exist previously. For example, they have to 
decide whether to embed similar technology into their digital cameras or to pivot and market 
their cameras to photography connoisseurs only. In the telecommunications industry, companies 
have to decide how to react to the increased demand for bandwidth to send photos. They also 
have to determine whether or not business, military, and consumer customers have different 
demands compared to one another. Convergence provokes changes that ripple across industries, 
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disrupting hardware as well as service models. Toward that end, the hardware of smartphones, as 
well as laptops, has improved dramatically in terms of screen size, resolution, brightness, 
memory size, and computing power. 
 
The process of convergence, in which previously isolated and independent technologies 
begin to share fundamental design properties and functionality, explains many of the changes in 
electronics products during the past few decades. Generally, when knowledge bases converge, 
technologies come together—synergies that are often driven by dynamics internal to the 
companies that produce them. As a result, the consumer experiences new combinations of 
previously separate technologies as novel and unexpected opportunities for communication and 
entertainment. Moreover, as industrial convergence is cemented, the boundaries between areas of 
technological expansion and growth disappear, and major markets such as consumer electronics, 
military tools, software, data-processing, and telecommunications become blended.85 As 
technologies are concentrated, the duration of time and the variety of ways in which people 
interact with their devices increase, inherently generating more data and metadata used for 
gaining insight into customer behavior as well as for surveillance.  
 
Convergence also creates more detailed and accurate data as more technologies are 
connected to the Internet and, by extension, connected to platforms that gather data and enhance 
their collection practices as part of their business models. Therefore, ICT convergence is helpful 
for surveillance since ICTs are producing and transmitting data that is richer in quality and 
specificity at all times. Whereas a car was once a metal box with seats and wheels, in 2018, a car 
is a computerized vehicle that produces and disseminates data about where one is going, when, 
how fast, and so on, qualifying its collected data for reuse later. Returning to the central 
argument that these technical changes somehow manifest themselves in social and cultural 
changes in American society, we hypothesize that this occurs through the institutional adoption 
and exploitation of changing technologies and their ability to gather, store, and analyze richer 
data sets—without user consent and, with respect to the Fourth Amendment, without a 
requirement for a search warrant. As ICTs become increasingly ubiquitous and accessible, these 
technologies, similar to those available in consumer markets, symbolically reflect the motives of 
their users.  
 
Pervasive surveillance programs are undefined and complex; they are simultaneously 
covert and overt, and they exist and thrive in current networked and digitally dependent settings 
that feed information collection-based business models. Under the surveillance agenda set forth 
in the aftermath of 9/11, both government and private-sector interests mobilized to monopolize 
social control.86 The surveillance society is supported by this transformation of information flows 
in which information is a lucrative commodity that simultaneously expedites communication and 
optimizes the targeted dissemination of goods and services.87 Therefore, as emerging and 
efficient ICTs have connected industries that collect and analyze data, surveillance has become a 
function of the technologies that organizations use, and society has henceforth reorganized 
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around this purpose to the detriment of the public interest.88 The next section outlines how the 
existence and use of the aforementioned technological norms and standards empower 
surveillance programs that, by design, violate earlier privacy norms rather easily. It also explains 
how and why the new surveillance programs at various levels of socio-political power (e.g., the 
NYPD, the NSA, and Facebook) could not have occurred without the technological changes 
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Chapter 5 
Changes Manifest Themselves: The New York City Police Department’s 
Domain Awareness System 
 
“CCTV is seen either as a symbol of Orwellian dystopia or a technology that will lead to crime-
free streets and civil behavior. While arguments continue, there is very little solid data in the 
public domain about the costs, quantity, and effectiveness of surveillance.”   
                            - Heather Brooke 
 
 
Changes in ICTs have equipped police departments across the nation with tools to collect 
data on citizens, including those who are not under investigation, on an unprecedented scale in 
terms of volume and breadth. While public surveillance is a legitimate tool for the police 
department to employ, this chapter examines the New York City Police Department’s (DAS)—a 
mass surveillance model that has generated substantial Fourth Amendment-related concerns. 
Public policing once required police officers to physically surveil an individual, a group of 
people, or a location for a specific period of time; this model has become obsolete in present-day 
policing, which consists of constant, remote, and limitless surveillance. Though the police 
department was once restricted by limited access to resources to generate more efficient 
surveillance techniques, technological convergence and industry overlap have facilitated 
mutually beneficial partnerships between the NYPD, Microsoft, IBM, and others, thus cementing 
a successful and lucrative 21st-century surveillance industry.  
 
The NYPD has a long history of using applied analytics to maximize the efficiency and 
effectiveness of officers on the ground. In 1993, the NYPD implemented CompStat, a collection 
of maps that charted crime, to share information between officers, improve their performance, 
and also hold officers accountable for their work.89 Expanding from CompStat, the DAS is the 
newest data collection analytics program, disseminating “research” to help both officers in the 
field and in the precinct make decisions.90 The police department puts decision making into two 
categories: tactical and strategic. The first type must be on the spot and quick, often a matter of 
minutes or seconds. The second type requires more time, a case that is larger in scope and 
requires a strategy.91 The DAS, comprised of a network of sensors, databases, devices, software, 
and infrastructure, delivers tailored information and analytics to mobile devices and desktops, 
and it assists with both types of decision making. In 2013, DAS software was initialized in 
everyday policing structures, and in 2014, a mobile version was optimized for smartphones and 
tablets. As of 2016, every one of the NYPD’s 36,000 officers had a smartphone device with the 
DAS.92  
 
This section closely examines two features of the DAS: CCTV camera surveillance and 
license plate readers (LPR) and their relationship to predictive technologies.  
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5.1. Closed-Circuit Television Cameras (CCTV)  
 
As of 2017, the DAS connects to 9,000 CCTV cameras across New York City, which are 
owned and operated by both the NYPD and private-sector entities such as the New York Stock 
Exchange.93 The NYPD uses video analytics on some of these cameras to trigger automated 
alerts when cameras detect suspicious behavior, such as the movement or appearance of a 
suspicious package. According to a 2017 publication by the NYPD describing the DAS, video 
analytics algorithms use background subtraction to compare an image to another time-averaged 
image and generate an alert when an object the size and shape of a package is motionless for a 
period of time.94 The department’s policy states that video camera surveillance footage is kept for 
30 days unless the footage is critical to an investigation, but questions persist about what happens 
within those 30 days or what third parties are able to do with the same footage. It is also worth 
mentioning that the publication did not disclose that the footage is intricately tagged and able to 
identify human subjects based the color of their clothing or height. However, in press coverage 
of an unrelated tour of the Lower Manhattan Security Coordination Center in 2011, this feature 
was specifically mentioned in a reference to the system’s ability to search by “people wearing 
red shirts,”95 which raises concern about the department’s vague and obscure approach to sharing 
information about the DAS with the public. 
 
The DAS is simultaneously covert and overt. On the one hand, it is public knowledge that 
the DAS is a system employed by the NYPD for policing comprised of a number of technical 
components. On the other hand, however, the institution does not disclose how it shares data 
with industry partners such as IBM, what is done with the data, how information is retained, and 
so on. A 2018 investigation conducted by The Intercept revealed IBM’s use of the NYPD’s 
CCTV-generated footage to develop technology capable of tagging skin color.96 The algorithm 
processed images with differing light quality and environmental features to perfect itself through 
machine learning. The investigation revealed that, in 2012, IBM tested this software on human 
subjects captured on CCTV systems and searched camera footage by using new identification 
features such as hair color, age, gender, and skin tone.97 While the NYPD has officially severed 
ties with IBM and repeatedly emphasized that these analytics were only used for testing and 
evaluation purposes, this form of collaborative, covert, pervasive watching effectively 
perpetuates a cultural norm of diminished privacy through public–private partnerships 
facilitating unregulated data surveillance. 
 
As novel technologies emerge, surveillance techniques simultaneously advance and 
adapt. In this case, CCTV surveillance infrastructure expands both in the quantity and quality of 
video cameras and as a tool connected to a greater database. The next step involves refining and 
expanding the types of identification features the technology consumes. In other words, the 
changes in data extraction and big data policing techniques through CCTV cameras could not 
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have occurred without the changes in remote camera technology and the various ways camera 
technology can be used. For example, in the Kyllo v. United States case, law enforcement agents 
used a thermal imaging device to track heat patterns in a home suspected of growing illegal 
marijuana plants.98 The court ruled that monitoring radiation constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment, which NYU privacy law professor Katherine Strandburg affirms by stating 
that “the increasing intrusiveness of video surveillance is primarily a result of technological 
advances. Video devices have become cheaper, smaller, and easier to hide, and video recordings 
easier to store and to search, thus making conventional social behavior more amenable to 
surveillance.”99  
 
This speaks to how surveillance programs such as the DAS were able to violate earlier 
Fourth Amendment privacy norms. Without regulatory protections against ubiquitous 
surveillance through the use of a number of technologies, privacy perpetually diminishes, as 
lawmakers lack hard a consensus on how the Fourth Amendment can or should address evolving 
location-tracking and imaging technologies. On the topic of vehicular tracking, Judge Posner 
comments, “[s]hould government someday institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular 
movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be 
interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.”100 In contrast, Judge Kozinski represents five 
judges in his long-form dissent: 
 
There is something creepy and un-American about such clandestine and underhanded behavior. To those of us who 
have lived under a totalitarian regime, there is an eerie feeling of déjà vu. This case, if any, deserves the 
comprehensive, mature and diverse consideration that an en banc panel can provide. We are taking a giant leap into the 
unknown, and the consequences for ourselves and our children may be dire and irreversible. Some day, soon, we may 
wake up and find we’re living in Oceania.101 
 
The enshrinement of sociocultural change in the form of diminishing privacy through 
ubiquitous technology is a process. Here, the process involves a change in technology through 
the convergence and dissemination of computer-connected video cameras as accessible 
consumer goods. This process then complicates the standards and norms of video technology as 
it becomes widely accessible because virtually anyone in a public space can capture and share 
video footage. Thus, its subsequent institutional application within a system like the DAS 
desensitizes society to the technology as an all-seeing surveillance tool. Video camera 
technology in a smartphone or laptop is able to create, collect, watch, save, and transfer footage, 
both in the form of content created by its user and content another user has made available on an 
app like Facebook or Snapchat. Similarly, the NYPD uses CCTV systems to monitor subway 
platforms, public parks, and more, an extension of an already accessible technology. In other 
words, CCTV systems are similar to smartphone cameras with different motives, and the norms 
of the technology align with the motives of the user.  
 
Programs such as the NYPD’s DAS further weaken the expectation of privacy in public 
spaces by explicitly linking its technical features back to the idea that access to instant databases 
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connected to CCTV systems will provide more safety and security. The contrapositive is also 
implicitly promoted—that not implementing emerging technologies would constitute an 
irresponsible negligence on behalf of law enforcement. Although all of the above may be true, a 
lack of transparency about data collection, processing, and transferring contribute to changing 
expectations of privacy in the public sphere. Furthermore, the closed-source models of 
information collection and processing leave the public in the dark about what is happening with 
their data and how.  
 
The simultaneous adoption, growth, and use of these technologies in policing, following 
the growth and use of “smart” and “handheld” consumer technologies, all degrade expectations 
of privacy. As harnessing the capabilities of data-surveillance technologies means pervasive 
public surveillance to monitor and catch a crime as it occurs or before it occurs, there is little to 




5.2.  License Plate Readers (LPRs)  
 
In addition to CCTV systems, the DAS connects to an organization of license plate 
readers comprised of at least 250 mobile detectors on police vehicles and at least 50 detectors 
covering traffic in and out of Manhattan via bridges and tunnels.102 The sensors are small and 
mountable; in addition to reading license plate numbers, they register the date, time, and speed of 
cars passing by. The LPRs then use optical character recognition to extract characters from each 
plate and compare them against plates of interest and “hot lists” generated by a number of 
criminal and terrorist watch lists. Furthermore, LPRs collect data on every car passing by, so 
much so that “the number of license plates that can be read is limited only by the number of 
vehicles passing the cameras.”103 Moreover, LPRs feature automated pattern recognition and 
predictive analytics algorithms to inform officers where and when a plate of interest is most 
likely to be scanned in the near future. These custom algorithms search for two patterns: time 
and place, and routing, a feature that the NYPD maintains is only used to monitor vehicles on a 
“hot list.” Pattern recognition and predictive analytics are useful forecasting tools that can 
identify the future location of a suspicious vehicle more efficiently, and officers can use them to 
instantly access data about the history of the plate through the DAS, which retains its scans for 
five years. Moreover, the forecasting feature also makes interdiction much more efficient, 
eliminating the need for field officers to monitor the vehicle over an extended period of time or 
install a GPS tracking device.  
 
Similar to CCTV cameras, other changes in technology seem intuitive because they are 
linked to the proliferation of camera and video technology, which society experiences through its 
increasing availability in consumer electronics. According to a Pew fact sheet about Americans 
and their Smartphones published in 2015, 92% of respondents were using their smartphones for 
voice and video calling, and 60% of respondents were using their phones for their photo and 
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video features.104 Again, LPRs contribute to this discussion because they are related to the 
proliferation of camera technology. As people increasingly possess devices with this capability, 
they are more accustomed to being recorded because they also record or, at the very least, have 
access to the technology to do so. In that vein, it is not solely the NYPD or the DAS that 
normalize the idea of pervasive surveillance; rather it is a question of how the police department 
as an institution concerned with policing is 
implementing and disseminating modern 
ubiquitous technology, creating a powerful and 
penetrating sociological norm of less or 
diminished privacy. Furthermore, the change in 
cultural standards that imply voluntary or even 
spontaneous public disclosure of private 
information with respect to the promptness in 
“providing personal information and the 
fascination with the personal aspects of other 
people’s lives is partly a heritage from the more 
liberal spirit of the 1960s.”105 However, this trend 
also reflects the need that modern people have, 
when in the ubiquitous presence of cameras and 
similar means, to see and be seen, to know and 
be known.106  
 
The normalization of data surveillance by 
the NYPD as a means of ensuring safety and security as part of the “war on terror” agenda 
ultimately shapes how these ICTs are understood and experienced. Surveillance can be identified 
as a “factor of production” whereby society is organized around norms that enhance data 
surveillance, such as video camera tracking capabilities, which simultaneously normalize day-to-
day surveillance as an element of modern society.107 Camera and video technologies and the 
various activities linked to them normalize surveillance in public spaces, and “citizens willingly 
[acquiesce] as surveillance subjects [as] greater levels of surveillance are often portrayed as an 
acceptable cost for enhanced levels of security.”108  
 
The breadth of LPRs’ capacity within the DAS does not quite end there. In 2016, the 
NYPD and Vigilant Solutions signed a contract that would permit the NYPD to use Vigilant’s 
database.109 Vigilant Solutions is a private company with a database of billions of LPR records 
collected from both private and law enforcement readers all across the United States. Vigilant’s 
database grows by 80 million data points per month, and the contract enables the NYPD to trace 
vehicles, locations, and travel patterns all around the country, including residential and 
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Figure I. Image from Vigilant Solutions Article “Protect 
LPR With Positive Legislation” 
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commercial complexes.110 As an organization committed to the safety and security of New 
Yorkers, why, then, is the police department interested in a nationwide LPR database? This 
question is larger than motives and intentions. If access to a database exists, the question 
becomes “why not?”, as the collection and storage of data points is now the default approach to 
information collection. The DAS’s newest collaboration is another instance of technological 
convergence and industry blurring. 
 
 Additionally, as seen in Figure 1, the legal realm hosts spirited debate about the use of  
such devices, as the interests for and against increasing surveillance technology square off. 
Powerful institutions such as the NYPD wield their influence in this debate, as Vigilant Solutions 
credits the “coordinated efforts of its law enforcement partners” in the fight to ensure that LPR 
collection and storage avoids legislative limits to its operation. Industry players benefit from the 
fact that it is “well established in the courts that there are no 4th Amendment implications in the 
use of LPR,”111 and as long as the debate is centered around the public feeling secure, the 
argument that more surveillance equals more safety will drive support for increased 
implementation of LPR and similar technologies. 
 
Collecting, coding, searching, and storing data from both CCTV systems and LPRs by 
police departments and their corporate sponsors also create the risk of an information monopoly 
or a bias of communication.112 Data storage comes with risks, such as too much, too little, or 
inaccurate data, and policing records notoriously contain much data “just in case,” which can 
easily prejudice the legal process.113 Additionally, innocent “people may not be aware of records 
held on them or may be unable to check them.”114 In sum, normalized surveillance in the public 
policing model is the effect of a process through which commonplace technologies serve the 
interest of their most powerful users, which creates and perpetuates a sociocultural norm of 
surveillance inherent within society. In addition to the reducing the costs of owning a video 
camera, technical advancements in big data, primarily their ability to aggregate and query a 
database, add to this change. Although the traditional CCTV models were dependent on law 
enforcement officers monitoring screens and footage to detect danger, the current model depends 
on algorithmic technologies to tag and organize footage in an effort to make it instantly 
accessible and searchable. The changes in the police department’s surveillance apparatus is 
facilitated by innovate technologies, the same technologies used by average citizens to connect 
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Chapter 6 
Edward Snowden and The National Security Agency 
 
“What we've seen over the last decade is we've seen a departure from the traditional work of the 
National Security Agency. They've become sort of the national hacking agency, the national 
surveillance agency. And they've lost sight of the fact that everything they do is supposed to make 
us more secure as a nation and a society.” 
          - Edward Snowden  
         
 
The collection of “Snowden documents” reveals in detail that the NSA’s surveillance 
activities have transformed the use of communications networks into an environment in which 
the agency can monitor and intercept all activity and interactions through communications 
infrastructure not only in the United States but around the world. In some cases, the programs 
operate with the conscious cooperation of private actors, while in others, companies are unaware 
that the NSA redirects their data for its overreaching surveillance efforts. The omnipresent nature 
of the NSA’s listening apparatus impinges upon citizens’ privacy in connected and unconnected 
social spheres—a right we previously, and should presently, retain fully under Fourth 
Amendment protections from search and seizure, as personal data arguably falls under the scope 
of “personal effects.” 
 
The NSA’s legacy of metadata collection has contributed to a societal change in which 
surveillance is the status quo, Fourth Amendment rights are compromised, and anonymity and 
autonomy are becoming historical remnants. The use of information technology tools to capture 
data and metadata in aggregate is a critical characteristic of the NSA’s modern surveillance 
efforts and thrives in two ways: First, the NSA leverages the sociopolitical and economic 
influence it maintains with private companies that own communications infrastructure.115 
Second, due to the breadth and scope of its surveillance programs, the NSA contracts its 
technical intelligence efforts to private firms such as Booz Allen Hamilton.116 In 2013, for 
example, approximately one million people held top-secret security clearance to gather and work 
with information about citizens in the U.S. and abroad, so long as the monitoring fell under the 
umbrella of national security threats.117  
 
Modern NSA surveillance would not be possible without the ability to allocate tens of 
millions of dollars118 to buying data directly from Internet service providers (ISPs), otherwise 
known as data mining.119 Therefore, the federal government’s failure to regulate data mining 
perpetuates the unfettered collection of data by corporate actors. The NSA’s engagement in 
contractual agreements with such actors then reinforces the asymmetric balance of power 
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between those whose data is mined and the government,120 a phenomenon similar to the public 
policing model discussed in the previous chapter. In cases where a third party does not respond 
to electronic surveillance record orders from the NSA, the NSA has taken upon it itself to “install 
a hardline tap in their server room,” as in the case of AT&T’s Room 641A.121 
 
Snowden’s revelations incited public outcry, along with legal debate surrounding the 
extent to which constitutional protection against bulk metadata collection regulated those 
charged with regulating such activity (i.e., Congress). While we depend on the Fourth 
Amendment to protect the civil liberties of American citizens, and despite minor 
advancements122 in defending such protections, the onset of sophisticated surveillance 
technology has exposed shortcomings in its 21st-century application. Along the same lines, since 
its inception, the evolution of the NSA’s surveillance program has revealed a notable shift 
toward increased private-sector participation in expanding surveillance practices, creating a 
space in which the capabilities and databases of private companies can serve as resources for 
program’s original motivations. This chapter examines Section 215 of the Patriot Act and 
XKeyscore, two NSA programs built upon bulk metadata collection, underlining the 
technologies that make them possible as surveillance programs and how these changes 
simultaneously challenge and normalize this model of government surveillance. 
 
 
6.1.  NSA Section 215 Bulk Metadata Collection Program and XKeyscore 
 
Under Section 215 of the 2001 PATRIOT Act,123 government-sanctioned bulk 
surveillance programs collecting global telecommunications data required, and often received, 
authorization from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).124 Declassified court 
orders reveal that the court mandated Verizon, among other major telecommunications 
providers, to hand over bulk telephony metadata to the NSA, ostensibly representing a record on 
every American using a mobile phone.125 While the USA Freedom Act nominally dismantled the 
program in 2015,126 under the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments 
Act, the FISC regained the ability to permit bulk metadata collection under Section 702.127 In 
other words, the data produced by any American with “links” to intelligence targets abroad, 
however tenuous, can be collected without a court warrant.128 Among the technical changes that 
largely contribute to the success of the 215 program is the spread of mobile communications 
technologies, namely cell phones and, later, networked smartphones, as well as computing 
capacity to automatically analyze metadata. The Pew’s Mobile Fact Sheet reveals that, in 2014, 
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92% of American adults had access to cell phones, 50% of which were smartphones.129 Coupled 
with Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine that justifies the program’s widespread data 
collection, the program succeeds in both its wide scope and level of access.  
 
Also revealed in Snowden’s 2013 disclosures is information about the NSA’s XKeyscore 
program. XKeyscore is the widest-reaching system for Internet-based intelligence collection, and 
it is similar to the telephony program in that it collects metadata as well. Training materials for 
XKeyscore reveal how analysts can use the program together with other systems to mine 
enormous agency databases. To begin a search, an analyst is required to fill in an on-screen form 
and enter in a generic justification for the search. The request to access databases and mine data 
sent in by an analyst is not reviewed by a court or anyone from the NSA before processing. 
Intelligence gathered from computer networks are called Digital Network Intelligence (DNI), 
and the XKeyscore documents further reveal that the program covers everything a typical user 
does on the Internet, including the content of emails, websites visited, and searches, as well as 
metadata. In addition to this, XKeyscore can be used to intercept and collect user data in real 
time.  
 
As described in the previous chapter, the NSA’s model of ubiquitous surveillance thrives 
because surveillance of increasingly connected technologies is cheap, and for the first time in the 
history of surveillance, there are innumerable ways to track, store, and analyze collected data in 
aggregate. For the NSA, as well as for third parties, cheap metadata surveillance is more useful 
than “about” content discussed earlier in this paper. “About” content requires a degree of focused 
and interpretive analysis to be meaningful, whereas metadata about who was called, at what 
time, and for how long is more revealing when analyzed by a computer and subsequently used to 
create patterns that reflect a person’s lifestyle and interests. For example, in an experiment at 
Stanford University where the metadata of 500 volunteers was collected over the course of 
several months, the amount of information revealed shocked the study’s researchers.130 A stream 
of metadata was able to determine that, of the experiment participants, one had suffered a heart 
attack, another had had an abortion, and another was an owner of semi-automatic weapons.131  
 
Following Snowden’s revelations of the NSA’s capabilities in 2014, people had a general 
awareness that using ICTs meant giving up some degree of privacy. In a 2014 Pew survey on 
government surveillance, 91% of adults agreed that consumers have lost control over how 
personal information is collected and used by companies.132 Of the respondents who used social 
networking sites (SNS), 80% cited concerns about third parties gaining access to their data via 
SNS, and another 70% expressed concern about the government’s access to information shared 
on SNS without their knowledge or consent.133 As mobile technologies become increasingly 
networked, accessible, and ubiquitous, so too does surveillance of these technologies. As 
underlined by the Pew statistics above, the societal effect of ubiquitous surveillance points to the 
public’s sense of fear and disempowerment as we lose control over our information. However, 
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mobile technologies continue to evolve in terms of size, features, and even price, and the number 
of Americans with mobile phones in 2018 has reached 95%, with 77% of those people owning a 
smartphone.134 As theorized earlier in this paper by David Lyon, the social process through 
which surveillance becomes a cultural norm is a process driven by collaboration. Collaboration 
between economic, political, and institutional powers, as well as participants in the broader 
society, increases the user base of mobile technologies, and it further drives the change in 
expectations of privacy that accompanies the adoption of such technologies. 
 
Society increasingly accepts, uses, depends on, and develops a symbiotic connection to 
the same devices and platforms that feed the metadata into the NSA's surveillance system in 
cooperation with the companies that produce and service those devices. This trust persists despite 
the fact that revelations about the telecommunications industry’s role in surveillance emerged 
almost a decade prior to Snowden’s. The Snowden revelations created public awareness of 
pervasive government surveillance, and to some extent, concern about how the government and 
social media sites are using people’s data. However, there was no identifiable public action in the 
form of severing ties with companies working closely with the NSA following Snowden’s 
revelations. Neither telecommunications companies nor Internet search engines, email providers, 
or social media platforms suffered from identifiable public backlash against their services.135 
General apathy in spite of awareness suggests that the lasting effect of learning that the federal 
government had collected data, with help from private companies, was a sort of learned 
helplessness in the face of degradation in expectations of privacy, cemented by a lack of Fourth 
Amendment protections.  
 
In 2014, in the immediate wake of the Snowden disclosures, telecommunications 
companies were regarded as more trustworthy than the government, as about 70% of Americans 
surveyed by Pew stated that they trusted their cell phone company to keep their data private, a 
group approximately 20% larger than the group that trusted the federal government.136 
Additionally, Americans were more confident in the ability of private institutions such as 
telecom platforms, email service providers, and credit card companies to secure their personal 
data than the federal government. The survey also revealed that 49% of respondents lacked 
confidence in the federal government’s ability to protect their data.137 Public outrage and concern 
following the Snowden leaks did not amount to action, and the aforementioned statistics 
demonstrating increased levels of trust in private companies are evidence of the process of 
normalization. In other words, the sociocultural effects of pervasive surveillance demonstrate 
how surveillance through networked technologies is normalized through convoluted expectations 
of privacy. Moreover, the process of normalization demonstrates how expectations of privacy 
can oscillate and how cultural attitudes surrounding privacy and expectations can shift depending 
on what standards and norms are prevalent in society at a given moment in time.  
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Social normalization facilitated by the NSA’s model of modern surveillance depends on 
society’s access to, and use of, ubiquitous technologies such as smartphones. As both access and 
use continue to grow across the United States, the social expectation of privacy is compromised 
and shifts from what those in charge of creating legally binding regulations had once sought out 
to promise (i.e., the federal government) to what those who are in charge of facilitating access to 
the tools themselves promise to their customers (i.e., private companies). In other words, 
Americans expect less, or have limited confidence in, the federal government’s ability to protect 
their data; at the same time, however, Americans have heightened levels of confidence in the 
service providers themselves. Hence, the Snowden scandal demonstrates an oscillation, a shift 
that demonstrates that society expects more privacy than what the aforementioned private 
companies who work alongside the federal government appear to offer.  
 
One explanation for this shift may be that the privacy policies offered by companies are 
perceived to be less covert and opaque, thus making them seem less conspicuous than those of 
the NSA. For example, according to the Pew Center’s “Web IQ Quiz” released in December 
2014 following the Snowden leaks, the 
majority of respondents answered, 
incorrectly, that a company’s privacy 
policy is meant to keep user information 
private.138 Inspired by Joseph Turow, a 
UPenn communications professor 
specializing in marketing, media, and 
privacy, the question sought to measure 
deeply embedded confusions and 
misinterpretations surrounding privacy policies across the web. Turow comments, “Many people 
don’t actually read privacy policies; they simply look at the label, and the intuitive 
understanding—the cultural understanding—of the label is that when something says ‘privacy 
policy,’ it protects your privacy.”139 In reality, the privacy policy discloses the terms by which a 
company stores users’ browsing data, as well as the terms governing how the company shares 
this information with other entities. 
 
In an age of technological convergence, everything—from social interactions, to 
shopping, to traveling—requires some level of information disclosure. Revelations about the 
federal government’s exploitation of networks that store data for mass surveillance has provoked 
a response from the implicated private-sector companies, specifically Apple, Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft, and Verizon, among others, as they undertake PR campaigns to portray their 
companies as being fundamentally concerned with user privacy. Sociological interpretations of 
privacy, through the process of normalization, have been adapted to accept the level of privacy 
dictated by private companies as confidence in the federal government and, by extension, the 
Fourth Amendment languishes. These statistics demonstrate that the most pressing problem of 
pervasive surveillance and its reach is not necessarily complacency or a lack of adequate 
knowledge among the greater public; rather, the problem lies in how data surveillance is 
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 Figure II. Question from Pew  Research  Center’s “Web IQ Quiz” 
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normalized as an impenetrable part of modern society. The process of normalization weakens 
sociological expectations of privacy and subjugates collective action against the federal 
government’s surveillance apparatus as an entity with more disciplinary power than the average 
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Chapter 7 
Facebook and Algorithmic Surveillance  
 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”  
             
           United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
 
So far, this paper has argued that surveillance has grown intensively and extensively 
since the early part of the 21st century as a result of emerging data-gathering technologies and 
the parallel integration of such technologies into institutional surveillance. It demonstrates that 
the proliferation of surveillance technologies creates everlasting fears with respect to how 
surveillance is transforming both quantitatively and qualitatively, as well as how a lack of 
protections rooted in the Fourth Amendment perpetuate this process.140 As the sphere most 
responsive to the preferences of the general public, the commercial surveillance model discussed 
in this chapter presents an opportunity for accountability and for expectations of privacy to 
oscillate again.  
 
According to Pew data published in 2016, 79% of all adult Americans online (86%) use 
Facebook, a 7% increase from 2015, making the social media company 47% more popular than 
the next leading platform, Instagram, which is also owned by Facebook.141 This chapter focuses 
on the sociological effects created by social media networks, namely Facebook, through its 
collection, processing, and dissemination of public and private user data. The working model of 
Facebook surveillance encourages its users to exhibit themselves on the platform so much so that 
they lose their inhibitions regarding “the type and quantity of information they have made 
available, as well as of the number of users accessing this information.”142 Although the platform 
is built on a model of user transparency that encourages information sharing and exposure, its 
data use policy is incoherent and paradoxical.143 Moreover, the political economy of privacy on 
Facebook is such that user behavior on the platform is commodified, as Christian Fuchs 
thoroughly summarizes:  
 
Facebook invests money (M) for buying capital: technologies (server space, computers, organizational infrastructure, 
etc.) . . . . The outcome of the production process P1 is not a commodity that is directly sold, but rather social media 
services (the Facebook platform) that are made available free to users . . . . The Facebook users make use of the 
platform for generating content when they upload their own data . . . . Their products include user-generated data, 
personal data, and transaction data about browsing and communication behaviors on Facebook . . . . Facebook sells the 
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users’ data commodity to advertising clients at a price that is larger than the invested constant and variable capital . . . . 
The difference is that the users are unpaid, and therefore infinitely exploited.144  
 
Facebook’s model could not have been successful without the data-generating characteristics of 
modern ICTs. Such characteristics enable Facebook to encode and quantify all areas of human 
interactions, including but not limited to "friendships, interests, casual conversations, 
information searches, expressions of tastes, emotional responses, and so on.”145 However, as 
Facebook users become increasingly aware of the risks inherent to Facebook with respect to 
privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and democratic ideals that characterize free 
and fair elections, the corporate model of surveillance is finally experiencing significant 
challenges. This chapter begins by outlining how algorithmic surveillance, one of the critical 
technical features of Facebook’s surveillance model, normalizes a narrow expectation of privacy 
on the platform. The subsequent sections examine Facebook’s role in the 2016 United States 
presidential campaign, as well as the 2017 Cambridge Analytica scandal, to arrive at the 
concluding discussion about how Facebook’s corporate model demonstrates people’s ability to 
oscillate expectations of privacy and challenge normalization.  
 
 
7.1. Data Collection, Algorithms, and Bias 
 
Facebook acts as a neutral facilitator of an exchange of user-generated content. Data and 
metadata are collected about user-generated content on the platform and later used for various 
purposes. For example, in 2013, a study revealed how, by studying patterns in the form of users’ 
“Like” history can successfully predict sensitive personal attributes such as age, gender, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious views, and happiness, among others.146 
Facebook uses these patterns to optimize user experience, but it also dumps critical data to the 
platforms for later use in both targeted advertising and predicting future behavior. Predicting 
future behavior by collecting pieces of information on an individual, or “life mining,”147 is useful 
for a wide variety of paying public and private partners, including intelligence agencies, market 
researchers, and think tanks, and it is facilitated by complex algorithmic analysis.  
 
Algorithms are computational artifacts that solve a given problem or accomplish tasks 
through detailed codes written in the form of rules and calculations. Algorithms have been 
involved in computing automation for decades but have only recently become common in 
popular discourse. According to Wagenknecht, Susann, et al., algorithms have transcended from 
technical artifacts to net infrastructure as they regulate, discern, and assert power through 
computation.148 The invisible authority of algorithms extends their computational influence to 
shape human-to-human interactions, broaden general societal outlooks (especially political), and 
ultimately drive trending ideologies among all user groups. Algorithms have transformed from a 
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series of computational codes embedded in software into nuanced elements of infrastructure 
responsible for effectively controlling all areas of the platform. Beyond Facebook, other platform 
giants including Amazon, Google, and Twitter all rely on algorithms to operate. The scientific, 
quantitative, and objective characteristics that form the basic nature of algorithms are inherently 
deceptive qualities. Algorithms within the current digital realm primarily function based on user 
behavior as an input. 
  
We can examine the “trending algorithm” as an example of one that successfully captures 
a user’s data and metadata to curate an individualized experience on the platform: 
 
Trending algorithms calculate the current activity around every post, image, or hashtag by combining some measure of 
each item’s popularity, novelty, and timeliness. Within these measures, are a number of assumptions. In particular, 
trending algorithms end to be concerned with a very broad who, and a very narrow when (and a little about what).149 
  
One of the first identifiable instances of the trending algorithm was Facebook’s experiment on 
user interaction with its “News Feed” feature. The “News Feed” algorithm was successful in 
learning what news- and media-related information it should share to particular users based on 
their individual likes and preferences on Facebook and its affiliated platforms.150 In addition to 
this, the algorithm could determine the user’s likelihood of liking, commenting, or sharing a post 
the algorithm pushed to the user, pertaining to news and media.151 Social media scholar Zeynep 
Tufekci defines algorithms as “computational processes that are used to make decisions of such 
complexity that inputs and outputs are neither transparent nor obvious to the human observer.”152 
In other words, Facebook’s algorithms make decisions on the user’s behalf at every point of 
interaction with the platform. Everything from the colors, photos, and the arrangements of posts 
that appear in the “News Feed” can, and now are, controlled by algorithms.  
 
For example, during the 2016 United States presidential campaign (USPC), the nature of 
information and disinformation disseminated across Facebook picked up speed through the 
relationship between the dubious nature of facts and the editorial nature of algorithmic processes 
on Facebook’s News Feed. During the USPC, the platform’s model (which depends on user data 
collection and algorithmic processes to create an “optimal user experience”), alongside Russian 
actors’ exploitation of existing algorithms, ensured that specious information surrounding wedge 
political issues reached targeted audiences across Facebook and a number of connected 
platforms.153 While platform companies argue that their algorithms are not trained to influence 
political dialogue one way or the other, the experiential reality of these features suggests 
otherwise: 
 
Trending algorithms measure, and they also announce. This makes them databased and calculating, and in doing so, 
they offer up a rich hieroglyph about some ‘us’, some public, that can itself be discussed and marveled over, or rejected 
                                                 
149 Robert Seyfert and Johnathan Roberge, Algorithmic Cultures (New York: Routledge, 2016), 54. 
150 Zeynep Tufekci, “Algorithmic Harms beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent Challenges of Computational 
Agency Symposium Essays,” Colorado Technology Law Journal 13 (2015): 213. 
151 Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 46. 
152 Zeynep Tufekci, “Algorithmic Harms beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent Challenges of Computational 
Agency," 206. 
153 “Partisanship, Propaganda, and Disinformation: Online Media and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election | Berkman 
Klein Center,” accessed November 20, 2017, https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2017/08/mediacloud. 
  35 
. . .; [algorithms] can be cultural objects of meaning, not just for those producing information and looking to them for 
amplification, but for those who see in them a reflection of the public in which they take part.154 
  
As Gillespie argues, trending algorithms do much more than spread information based on 
popularity; they become a symbolic representation with cultural significance. Regardless of the 
topic, the fact that a certain story or idea is “trending” or “viral” is influential in and of itself.155 
In other words, a group of trending topics taken together can 
represent a pseudo-collective consciousness, a moment in time in 
which a certain set of ideas define the outlook of the public. While 
the process of content reaching this status is often spontaneous, the 
ability to dependably promote “trending” content has spawned an 
industry. Using technology such as “bots,” or zombie accounts that 
automatically like/retweet content, these trends can be controlled by 
experienced actors—usually marketing firms with relatively 
innocuous, commercial motives. However, this space is increasingly 
occupied by actors affiliated with national governments and 
ideological groups whose objectives generally center on manipulating 
public opinion. 
 
Russia, an external actor that has not traditionally been 
directly involved in the natural exchange of ideas within the 
American public sphere, nonetheless supplanted genuine social 
interactions and positioned its content as an authoritative source of 
information within these platforms. Covertly, Russia suffused 
coercive influence within American sociopolitical dialogue, 
exacerbating the tenor of conversations on digital platforms without 
actively participating in them. Recently revealed examples of 
Russian-produced social media content showcase wedge issues 
within American culture such as veterans, gun rights, refugees/immigration, among others.156 
Naturally, the incendiary nature of these posts translated into robust sharing and commenting, 
raising their profile under the guise of a naturally resonant post. The platform’s nature augments 
the ability to spread information favorable to a certain ideology or campaign independent of their 
truth value—the more provocative and controversial the content, the more algorithms amplify an 
idea’s reach. 
 
This form of data surveillance, in which predictive analyses and the greater scope of 
algorithmic processes gleaned from user data inform and influence opinions and discourse, also 
contributes to the process of normalization. The nature of Facebook’s service is “designed to 
lower privacy levels and to exploit the social information users provide willingly.”157 The 
degrading expectations of privacy facilitated by algorithmic processes in order to provide 
optimized user experience have increasingly identifiable effects. In this case, the effects include 
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their ability to popularize fake news, spread disinformation, and individually target Americans 
based on their data, their likelihood to vote for a certain candidate, or their ability to be 
persuaded as a swing voter. As demonstrated by the USPC, these effects extend well beyond a 
breach of personal privacy on the platform and, as such, have alarmed users, similar to the 
shocked dismay generated following the Snowden disclosures.  
 
The Pew Center’s report entitled “Public Attitudes Towards Algorithms” found that 
Americans expressed most concern about how algorithmic processes violate privacy. In addition 
to privacy, other top concerns included how algorithms can represent unfair biases and “remove 
the human element from important decisions.”158 Moreover, the ubiquitous nature of algorithms 
on social media has led the majority of Americans to feel that the content misrepresents their 
lived experience. Algorithms and algorithmic infrastructure have become unassailable truth 
mechanisms. Coupled with the dissemination of untruthful and misleading information online, 
algorithms have such an extraordinary amount of power that “[t]he Internet has become not just a 
weapon in the world’s great political battles. It has become the weapon for ideological influence, 
and careful use can mean the difference between winning and losing.”159 Although the 2016 
USPC brought attention to how organizations exploit user data augment people’s experience on 
the platform, but the 2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal presented society with truths that finally 
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Chapter 8 
Looking Beyond: Cambridge Analytica and the Future of the “Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy” 
 
 
“Solitude sometimes is best society.”             
                                    - John Milton  
 
 
In the spring of 2018, the data-mining voter profiling firm Cambridge Analytica came 
under scrutiny following revelations about their involvement in the most extensive “data breach” 
in the history of Facebook. In brief, the data generated by Aleksandr Kogan’s personality-quiz 
app downloaded by 270,000 Facebook users was stored on a private database. The extracted data 
was later provided to Cambridge Analytica, which later used the database containing information 
on 50 million users to create 30 million “psychographic” profiles about voters.160 Psychographic 
market segmentation, or more generally, psychographic research, clusters customers by their 
shared personality traits, beliefs, values, attitudes, interests, lifestyles, and more.161 
Psychographic data is extremely specific and thus can be used to accurately target customers 
or—in this case—voters. It was also revealed that Cambridge Analytica shares ties with some of 
Trump’s major supporters: One of the most infamous is Rebekah Mercer, co-owner of Breitbart 
News and a Republican donor whose father invested $15 million in Cambridge Analytica. 
Cambridge Analytica used its “psychographic” tools to create targeted online ads for Trump’s 
2016 election campaign, Ted Cruz’s campaign, and even Brexit.162 Consequently, Facebook, as 
the platform that facilitated the relationship between Kogan’s app and Facebook users, saw its 
exploitative and confusing privacy policies come under even more scrutiny by its users asking 
whether Facebook users were actually safe.   
 
The Fourth Amendment has yet to be applied to social networking tracking, and debates 
persist with respect to its applicability. In the 2012 U.S. v. Jones case, the Supreme Court held 
that collecting and tracking GPS data of a vehicle’s movement constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment based on the volume of data collected. Justice Samuel Alito noted that “the 
growing use of tracking through mobile devices [and] tracking through ‘social tools’ on phones 
can shape expectations of privacy.”163 Similarly, in Katz v. United States, Justice John Marshall 
Harlan commented that “electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place may constitute a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.” However, it remains unclear what defines public and 
private electronic information on social media platforms such as Facebook. In contrast to these 
more forward-thinking comments and arguments, according to Justice Hugo Black, courts may 
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find extending the Fourth Amendment to include electronic intrusions in order to “bring the law 
into harmony with the times” improper and inappropriate.164 The argument that the privacy 
policies of social media sites such as Facebook do sufficiently warn users against posting 
information that they intend to keep private is most commonly cited against the application of 
Fourth Amendment protections, as users both willingly give consent and expose sensitive 
information anyway.165 However, the shaky justification that Facebook’s privacy absolves with 
respect to how people’s data is stored and used does not translate well to actual users, and most 
Americans hold misguided ideas about privacy policies as a whole, as described in the preceding 
chapter.   
 
Revelations regarding how and to what extent institutions are able to surveil has agitated 
the general public to move beyond learned helplessness and complacency. Whereas public and 
government surveillance had a normalization effect enabled by and in collaboration with 
commercial interests, the effects of the 2016 USPC and the 2017 Cambridge Analytica scandal 
are identifiably different. Increasingly, it appears that Facebook’s user base views the cultural 
norms with respect to privacy set by the company as unacceptable, as indicated by some recent 
trends, such as users changing their relationship with the platform by severing ties with 
Facebook, taking a break, updating their privacy settings, or joining the #DeleteFacebook 
campaign. In a 2018 Pew survey entitled “Americans Are 
Changing Their Relationship with Facebook,” data reveal 
that, between June 2017 and 2018, 74% of Facebook 
users have either adjusted their privacy settings, taken a 
break from Facebook, or deleted the app from their 
phones—the first time Facebook has experienced a shift 
of this nature.166  
 
In 2010, Mark Zuckerberg commented that 
popularity around blogging has created an environment 
where people have become accustomed to sharing all of 
their information. In an effort to prescribe the social 
effect, he commented, “People have really gotten 
comfortable not only sharing more information and 
different kinds, but more openly and with more people. 
That social norm is just something that’s evolved over 
time.”167 The evolving “social norm” Zuckerberg 
describes is the sum of an equation comprised of two 
parts: information sharing by users on the platform, and 
concurrent surveillance and commodification of user 
data and behavior. Only recently has the latter part of the equation, which facilitated the 
normalization of Facebook surveillance culture through algorithmic processes, targeted ads, and 
                                                 
164 Schmidt, “Social Networking and the Fourth Amendment: Location Tracking on Facebook, Twitter, and 
Foursquare,” 526. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Andrew Perrin, “Americans Are Changing Their Relationship with Facebook,” Pew Research Center (blog), 
accessed January 5, 2019, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/05/americans-are-changing-their-
relationship-with-facebook/. 
167 Ibid., 528. 
Figure IV. From Pew Survey “Americans Are 
Changing Their Relationship with Facebook” 
  39 
optimized experiences, caused a disturbance in the public sphere. Recent developments about the 
platform’s operational business model, how it affects and influences its users, how it is 
susceptible to external manipulation, and how it approaches user data, have generated a shift in 
the balance of power. In a change from historical trends, American society has seen an 
oscillation to a more skeptical view of corporate surveillance. 
 
Facebook as an example of corporate surveillance—one entirely set in motion by an end 
user, whether by social pressures, personal desire, or a habitual pattern of behavior—presents an 
opportunity for the strongest oscillation of the three cases presented (the NYPD, the NSA, and 
Facebook). The tone of press coverage and people’s reactions to the USPC and the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal signify a change in how we approach surveillance. Facebook is one of many 
platforms that operate with a business model of this type, and recent revelations about Facebook 
with respect to user data privacy has set in motion an influential trend of modifying our 
relationship with it. This change could represent a pause on the socio-cultural effect of 
normalization that modern pervasive surveillance models have for so long perpetuated and 
exploited.  
 
As emerging technologies complicate how users experience technologies built with 
intrinsic surveillance features, expectations of privacy are challenged, and pervasive surveillance 
is inevitably normalized. However, the normalization of surveillance culture may overcome its 
current pause, as the Facebook model continues to demonstrate. Society may organize to 
challenge and effectively break the process entirely by severing ties with platforms and devices 
perpetuating the norm, thus depriving them of the user data on which they run. Unlike the NYPD 
and the NSA, commercial entities are more sensitive to changes in demand based on customer 
preferences, and the mounting pressure on Facebook and similar platforms could portend a sea 
change in how these companies govern themselves. In turn, this movement could expand and 
motivate people to demand protections under the Fourth Amendment that accurately represent 
the privacy concerns of the 21st century. 
 
There has never been a better time for acting against the infrastructure of surveillance, as 
public resentment towards its intrusive nature, especially the commercial model, has spurred 
people to act when they have never done so previously. The pendulum is reaching the end of its 
swing towards increased surveillance, and understanding how it was set in motion will help us 
dictate the next strokes of the clock. People are more informed than ever about the nature of 
surveillance, and are beginning to understand that although their right to privacy is encoded in 
the Constitution, it does not reflect actual expectations of privacy. Moreover, people can change 
their preferences more readily than the Supreme Court can rule to reinforce protections against 
21st century privacy intrusions, and personal decisions about privacy can be taken in the absence 
of a silver bullet legal decision. While the right to privacy is less tangible than other fundamental 
needs such as food, water, and shelter, life under pervasive surveillance impinges upon the most 
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